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Abstract 
International migration is one the greatest challenges in the era of globalization and has 
become a focus of political debate in recent years. Although the economic effects of 
migration increase the efficiency of labour markets, some governments have rigorously 
rejected solutions proposed for the current refugee crisis. Meanwhile, immigration policies 
have recently become stricter in several OECD countries. 
Based on this conceptual framework, several labour market institutions, such as a minimum 
wage, unemployment benefits, union density, and active labour market policies etc., are 
analysed in the context of enhancing the employment of immigrants. In order to support the 
findings of literature this paper concentrates on the determinants of immigration tendencies 
and dynamic regression models analysed to clarify how these institutions can affect native- 
and foreign-born migrants. Hence, our results also highlight that various reforms need to 
enhance the efficiency of labour market migration policies. 
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Introduction 
International migration is one the greatest challenges in the era of globalization. While the 
obstacles to international trade and capital mobility have been removed (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004), the legal permanent migration to the OECD countries has increased to 4.3 
million, with one million concentrated in the European Union, which is now equivalent to 
the figure recorded in the United States (OECD, 2015a). In nearly all of these countries, the 
majority of new arrivals are the result of family reunification, but the number of asylum 
seekers who come primarily in order to work has increased over the past decades (Kerr and 
Kerr, 2011). 
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Nevertheless, many Europeans emigrated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nowadays 
the direction of migration has already changed and the reception and granting of asylum has 
become a relevant economic and social experiment in many previously sending countries. 
This phenomenon reveals that international migration has received increasing attention 
from policymakers since the fall of the ‘Iron Curtain’ and the increased economic effects of 
globalization (Coleman, 2009). 
Although, economic theories have suggested that migration increases the efficiency of the 
labour market by reducing cross-country disparities, and increasing mobility, which results 
in higher productivity (Kwok and Leland, 1982), but migration is so rigorously restricted 
and rejected by some politicians. In most of the OECD countries, migration policy is highly 
controversial. On the one hand, there are those who are keen to host even more migrants to 
ﬁll vacant positions or to provide tax revenue for their future pensions (Borjas, 2005). 
However, there are others, who fear that migrants will eventually steal their jobs, increase 
crime rates, and eliminate support for social transfers (Boeri and Van Ours, 2013). These 
theoretical discussions also emphasize that migration has the potential to increase wage and 
income inequalities among the immobile native workforce. Indeed, these effects can reduce 
the economic gains of migration and create political and social opposition (Becker, 1974). 
Thus, the increased illegal immigration of unskilled workers has resulted in higher costs of 
job protection and higher social security contributions (Pakurár et al., 2013). The measures 
influence public opinion against immigrants and encourage the governments to adopt 
unenforceable restrictions, and so a new vicious circle can start. 
However, a political consensus seem to appear to have emerged by governments closing the 
door on welfare and introducing rewards only for skilled migrants, but several unanswered 
questions remain, i.e. how labour institutions can influence the employment of migrants. 
Throughout this paper, we also argue that, institutional theoretical perspective is relevant 
since it extends the achievements and existing frontiers of labour economics (North, 2000). 
From this perspective, our research questions are the following:  
 What are the recent employment tendencies of native- and foreign-born immigrants 
in OECD countries? According to the OECD (2017e) definition, the foreign-born 
immigrants covers all people who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their 
current country of residence. Thus, a native-born citizen of a country is whose migrant 
parents’ place of birth is the host country (OECD, 2015b). 
 What characteristics are typical of native and foreign-born migrants? 
 How can labour market institutions relate to these migrants? 
The rest of this paper structured as follows. In the next sections we will briefly summarize 
the theoretical background to immigration policies. Then, we will focus on employment 
tendencies of native and foreign migrants in OECD countries. We will also carry out a 
dynamic regression analysis with panel data to investigate how the employment growth of 
migrants correlates with various labour market institutions. At the end of this paper we will 
also draw some conclusions and policy implications to support a better understanding of 
immigration policies, and highlight the importance of changes in current employment 
legislation systems. 
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1. The theoretical framework of migration policies 
According to Smith (1776), the level of wages makes it possible to equalize supply and 
demand for every kind of job. This led him to explain the existing wage differentials among 
jobs and competition between employers and workers. In this competitive labour market, 
migration should negatively affect the wages and employment of natives (Borjas, 1994). At the 
end of the 19th, a marginal revolution laid the groundwork for modern economic theories. In 
the beginning, competitive models tended to conceal features that are essential to the labour 
market. Marshall (1890) was one of the first who was driven by realism to recognize the role of 
market imperfections and pointed out that the least skilled workers – those with low incomes 
and few savings – have to sell their labour quickly and are at a disadvantage in wage 
bargaining. Since then, labour economics has emerged as a discipline and its primary approach 
has been to take into account the institutional specifics of labour markets in order to understand 
in general all elements that can affect wage and employment relationships. 
Since the neoclassical labour economics has evolved, as have many other economic fields, 
emerging theories have made great strides, for example, in the analysis of informational 
asymmetries, dynamic behaviour and the application of modern econometric techniques 
(Boettke et al., 2008). Moreover, labour market imperfection has played a great role in 
macroeconomic research since the causes of unduly low employment, durable involuntary 
unemployment; immigration crises, etc. have recently been primarily economic and social 
challenges (Cahuc and Zylbelberg, 2010). 
The migration problems most frequently occur in those countries that enforce some form of 
wage rigidities (Carens, 1987). However, the role of wage-setting institutions depends on 
the market penetration of migrant workers (Borjas, 1995). In these cases, native workers 
lose their jobs and unemployment increases among them if more migrants come to look for 
work. As a result, the total income of natives in the immigration country declines, and 
unemployment appears among them (Card and DiNardo, 2000). Controversially, there is 
also an increase in national income as regards an immigration surplus, which is encouraged 
by changes in native wages and the size of migration flows (Kopczuk et al., 2005). The 
consensus regarding the disparities in returns to skills between migrants and natives 
highlights the fact that immigrants have lower returns to education and labour market 
experience than natives and, in particular, lower returns to human capital accumulated 
abroad (OECD, 2014). At the same time, there is a conflict of interest between native- and 
foreign-born employers over migration policy. Consequently, some of the migrants are not 
interested in working and integrating into the labour market, reducing output per capita in 
the host country (Borjas, 2006). In order to solve this crisis, Hans-Werner (2004) proposed 
a temporary reduction in the benefits provided by the welfare systems to migrants. 
Although this can reduce migration flows, it also affects adversely the employment of 
foreign-born migrants by pushing them into illegal activities. However, Dustmann and Gitz 
(2005) revealed that many people are concerned about welfare exploitation of immigrants, 
so closing the door may not be a credible policy in those countries where immigration is 
high. In 1996, in California, the reform of a decentralized welfare system that strongly 
discriminated against immigrants failed due to political and judicial resistance, and 
ultimately reverted to the previous system (Boeri et al., 2002). 
Introducing a points system is another solution that rewards skilled migration by ranking 
applications for residence and work permits. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, and other OECD countries in the process of registering migrants have already 
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implemented this system. Each migrant allocated a score based on criteria, which typically 
incentivize educational attainment, job experience and language skills etc. They can also 
specify some bonus points in occupations and regions where there is a shortage of workers. 
An operational points system can encompass the entire range of regulation policies and 
seems to be quite effective in selecting highly skilled migrants (Hatton, 2004). Although 
the immigration of skilled workers may reduce income inequalities in the recipient country, 
these legislation systems may also discriminate against certain countries of origin rather 
than simply based on skill levels (Antecol et al., 2003). 
The immigration policy is one of the outcomes of a complex interaction of economic, political 
systems, social structures and basic human behaviour (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2013). 
Thus, migration policies have relevant interactions with other institutions, as discussed in this 
paper. In particular, the employment of migrants affected by, for example, the minimum 
wage, legislation and unemployment beneﬁts etc., via the wage compression, fiscal 
distribution and skill composition of migration (Boeri and Van Ours, 2013). However, labour 
market institutions never operate in isolation and their employment effects usually interact 
with each other, so we needed to examine each of them in the following sections. 
 
2. Employment trends of migrants by birth of origin in OECD countries 
In this section we briefly overview the labour market performance trends of native- and 
foreign-born immigrants in the OECD countries. Overall, the average employment rate of 
foreign-born migrants in this area increased by 1.3 percentage points between 2011 and 
2014, compared with 0.5% for the native-born migrants, while unemployment was steady 
in the same period (OECD, 2016). However, in the rest of these countries the labour 
outcomes of foreign- and native-born employees have been either stable or improving in 
recent years. The employment trends of foreign- and native-born migrants have followed 
different paths in the examined period. However, the growth in employment was higher for 
foreign than native-born workers (Figure no. 1); in almost all of the OECD countries the 
foreign-born share in employment has increased due to the demographic trends of ageing 
natives and new arrivals of immigrants (OECD, 2012). 
Analysing the trends in the employment rates of native-born and foreign migrants in 2007, 
2010 and 2014, we found differ patterns in the OECD countries (Figure no. 2). Only four 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Slovenia) saw a decline in the employment rates of 
both native- and foreign-born migrants in this period. Thus, these countries have not yet 
recovered from the crisis and have a better employment performance among the native-
born. Even within countries, the circumstances differ among migrant groups. For instance, 
Estonia had better employment rate outcomes for native-born migrants, while in Denmark 
the proportion of foreign-born workers was higher than the native-born ones. Within other 
countries, such as in the US, specific older-age migrant groups have managed better than 
young foreign-born workers have in the recovery period (OECD, 2015a). 
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Figure no. 1: Percentage of native and foreign employment growth  
in selected OECD countries (100%=2000) 
Source: based on authors’ own calculations and OECD, 2016a; OECD, 2016b 
Some characteristics of foreign and native-born migrants explained in part by the actual 
employment gap between these groups. In the OECD examined countries, the employment 
gap was higher if migrants had the same age and levels of education and skills. In Tables 
no. 3 and 4 (see Appendix) we also demonstrate that in our estimations, which are based on 
the most recent OECD census (2016c), there are statistically significant associations 
between the place of birth of migrants, their age and educational attainment. According to 
the chi-square (2) values and the proportions of the cross tables (Tables no. 3 and 4), 
native-born employees seem older than foreign-born. Thus, the proportion of less skilled 
foreign-born asylum seekers is higher (at 55.6%) than that of native migrants (52.3% at 
ISCED (0-4) levels). Thus, the proportion of the highest ISCED 6 educational attainment 
level for natives is 21.7%, but only 15.7% for foreign migrants. Hence, we can confirm that 
native-born migrants are older and have higher skills than the foreign migrants have. 
 
Figure no. 2: Employment rates (%) by place of birth in selected OECD countries 
(1997, 2011, 2014) 
Source: calculations based on OECD, 2015; p. 67 
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3. Analysing the impact of institutions on foreign- and native-born employment 
through a dynamic approach 
Most of the studies in the literature have focused on and estimated the effects of migration 
on the employment and/or wages of natives (Boeri et al., 2002; Borjas, 2003). Other 
examinations have concluded that the effect of immigration on the labour market outcomes 
of natives is small (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995) and the impact of immigration on the wages 
of competing native workers is also not high in the US data (Smith and Edmonston, 1997). 
The empirical evidence from European countries also points to minor influences of 
migration on the wages and employment of natives. 
These empirical findings, reconciled with the effect of self-selection of immigrants into 
high-wage regions, stem from the fact that they are not randomly distributed across labour 
markets. Obviously, migrants decide to locate to a given region where better earnings and 
employment opportunities are available. On the regional level higher wages or lower 
unemployment are likely to attract more migrants, and generate a positive correlation 
between migration flows and native wages (Borjas, 1987). The changing patterns of 
international migration relate to the responses of native workers. As more migrants arrive in 
a given area, natives may respond by moving to other attractive regions or cities. This 
effect appears where interregional labour mobility is relatively high (Blanchard and Katz, 
1992) and strongly responsive to market legislation. Others (Lewis, 2005) have also pointed 
out that open economies may adjust to migration by changing the composition of the output 
or production technologies to obtain the benefits from the increased labour supply. This 
adjustment in product specialization takes time and may explain the minor effects of 
migration on the wages and employment of natives. 
The demand for efficient migration policies to increase their employment suggest that 
appropriate econometric methods required to analyse the employment of migrants by place 
of birth. The causality in this context is also important when examining the effects of other 
determinants, such as labour institutions, in terms of how they can enhance or decrease the 
employment of immigration by place of birth. However, no clear consensus has yet 
emerged, and several unanswered questions has remained, i.e. about whether protective or 
counter-productive alternative immigration policies needed in Europe (Angrist and Kugler, 
2003). Based upon this research question, the following hypothesis is formed: 
H1: Labour market institutions related differently to the employment growth of foreign- and 
native-born migrants. 
Taking into account the needs of endogeneity, dynamic GMM estimations calculated, 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), to determine how institutions might have an 
impact on employment growth in long run. Our dynamic models include the lagged 
dependent variables among repressors. These model specifications require instrumentation 
to employ lagged levels of dependent and predetermined variables, as well as differences 
between the exogenous variables as instruments. 
Using this elementary model of demand specification (Equation 1) we establish the impacts 
of some labour market institutions on employment growth and suspect that each of them 
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plays a different role in the case of foreign and native migrants. In this study, 26 OECD 
countries1 are used and databases gathered from the period between 2000 and 2014. 
After taking the first difference and log of the dependent variable2, the following regression 
formula tested in employment of migrants by place of birth: 
itit
itititititoit
eALMPs
EPLUnionsUBswagesyy

 
)ln(
)ln()ln()ln()ln(lnln
5
543211

  (1) 
Where we used the following abbreviations: 
Δvar – variable in first difference. 
Δvart-1 – lagged differences of variables. 
ln – in natural logarithm. 
yi,t – ratio of native- and foreign-born employment of country i for the period t. According 
to the OECD (2016a and 2016b) definition of native-born employment, this rate covers the 
share of employed native-born individuals aged 15-64 in the total native-born population 
(active and inactive persons) of that same age. The foreign-born employment rate 
calculated as the share of employed foreign-born individuals aged 15-64 in the total 
foreign-born population of that same age. Employed people are those who worked at least 
one hour, or who had a job but were absent from work during the reference week.  
yi,t-1 – lagged employment growth rates. 
(wages)i,t  – real minimum wages in constant (USD, 2014) prices (OECD, 2017a). The 
minimum wage is a labour market institution that sets a wage floor, as a lower limit to the 
wage paid to individual workers. Since Stigler (1947), there have been various empirical 
studies analysing the features of minimum wages (Gramlich, 1976; Mincer, 1976; Flinn, 
2007) etc. Neumark and Wascher (2007) found at almost 2/3 of these studies, a negative 
employment effect of minimum wages. 
(UBs)i,t  – unemployment benefits as a percentage of output (OECD, 2017b). Unemployment 
benefits (UBs) protect against uninsurable labour market risks and offer replacement income to 
workers after having lost their jobs (Cahuc and Zylbelberg, 2010). Nowadays, many OECD 
countries have UBs (Boeri and Macis, 2010) and providing more and more protection against 
income fluctuations and job loss. In our estimates we tested the ratio of UBs divided by GDP 
to confirm whether they increase or decrease employment of migrants. 
(Unions)i,t – trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners who are 
trade union members, as included in OECD (2017c). Labour (or trade) unions are primarily 
voluntary membership organizations that represent the interests of their members (Máté, 
2014). At the beginning of the 20th, they became national organizations aiming to include 
all employees and to take place in a greater political role (Dolado et al., 1996). 
                                                 
1 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States. 
2 We tested our unbalanced data with IPS (Im–Pesaran–Shin) panel unit root tests (Im et al., 2003). In 
each of the dependent variables we can reject the null hypothesis of containing unit roots. In the 
case of native- and foreign-born employment the z-stats are 6.09, and 6.93 at the p<0.01 level. 
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Nevertheless, there are two research directions in the empirical literature on the effects of 
unions on the labour market. Some researchers have estimated their relationship between 
members’ wages and non-members i.e. Checchi and Lucifora (2002) etc., while others have 
concentrated on union density and their bargaining coordination effects on (un)employment 
(Nickell and Andrews, 1983; Ebbinghaus and Wisser, 2000). 
EPLi,t – employment protection legislation measures the procedures and costs involved in 
dismissing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on 
fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts (OECD, 2017d). Employment protection 
legislation (EPL) is a set of mandatory restrictions governing the dismissal of employees. 
Although the purpose of EPL is to increase the volume and stability of employment, there is an 
intense debate on its effects because of mixed empirical evidence (Piore, 1986). Essentially, 
EPL may affect the equilibrium level of employment in different ways. By reinforcing job 
security, EPL enhances performance, as workers will be more willing to cooperate with other 
employers in the production process. Better skilled workforces also increase flexibility and 
finally lead to a better functioning of their activity (Akerlof, 1984). However, if the labour 
market regulation is strict, as in many EU countries, firms may become more cautious about 
adjusting their workforce with the ultimate effect of reducing labour turnover, e.g. flows from 
employment to unemployment and vice to versa (Bertola, 2004). 
ALMPsi,t – public expenditure on active labour market programs, as a percentage of GDP 
(OECD, 2017b). Active labour market programmes include all social expenditure, which is 
aimed at improving the search for gainful employment, or otherwise increasing peoples 
earning capacity. This institutional category includes, for example, spending on public 
employment services and administration; training and special programmes for the young 
when in transition from school to work; programmes to promote (un)employment and 
special programmes for the disabled. ALMPs aim to improve the functionalities of the 
labour market by enhancing the mobility and adjustment of employment (Calmfors, 1995). 
ei,t – error term. 
In our empirical results significant interactions were found in the case of minimum wages, 
union density, unemployment benefits (UBs), and EPL and ALMPs in the case of the 
native-born migrants. From the point of view of foreign-born workers, only UBs and 
unions correlated significantly. Tables no. 1 and 2 below present the results of our 
estimations.  
Table no. 1: Results of dynamic panel regressions of Equation (1)  
in the OECD countries examined in the case of native-born immigrants 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate of native-born migrants 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 
constant 6.752 8.641 15.358 17.315 19.449 
  (4.21)*** (4.21)*** (7.37)*** (7.64)*** (8.72)*** 
ln(y)i,t-1 0.354 0.231 0.207 0.323 0.234 
  (7.04)*** (4.88)*** (6.95)*** (7.29)*** (8.45)*** 
ln(wages)i,t -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0009 
  (-5.68)*** (-4.51)*** (-6.15)*** (-7.16)*** (-12.68)*** 
ln(UBs) i,t   -3.621 -3.457   -5.435 
    (-18.94)*** (-17.03)***   (-8.36)*** 
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Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 
ln(Unions)i,t     -0.207 -0.274 -0.209 
      (-17.03)*** (-9.85)*** (-10.04)*** 
ln(EPL)i,t       -0.354   
        (-2.35)**   
ln(ALMPs)i,t         1.975 
          (8.72)*** 
Number of Observations 185 175 176 185 159 
Number of Countries 26 26 26 26 26 
Number of Instruments 19 13 14 19 15 
Wald test 65.19*** 1009.1*** 1321.4*** 371.19*** 1517.2*** 
AR test (-2.47)** (-2.43)** (-2.62)*** (-2.03)** (-2.41)** 
Sargan test 12.16 8.74 9.01 6.54 11.43 
Source: our estimations based on OECD, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d 
Notes: * Heteroscedasticity robust z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, respectively. P-values without an index mean that the 
coefficient is not significant even at the 10% level. 
The long run effects of some labour institutions on employment growth reported here. In 
our estimation, the two-step GMM estimators are preferred, as Windmeijer (2005) suggests, 
in order to handle the proposition of downward biased standard errors. In other words, it is 
not only the institutions examined which can affect the employment of migrants; other 
country specific determinants (output, social inclusion and job satisfaction etc.) might also 
correlate with employment growth in the long run. The limited amount or lack of cross-
country data restricts our models. 
Table no. 2: Results of dynamic panel regressions of Equation (1)  
in the OECD countries examined in the case of foreign-born immigrants 
Dependent variable: employment growth rate of foreign-born migrants 
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 
constant -4.793 0.005 6.514 15.226 8.331 
 
(9.86)*** 0.01 0.88 (1.83)* 0.99 
ln(y)i,t-1 0.178 0.202 0.197 0.143 0.234 
 
(9.86)*** (6.28)*** (6.61)*** (6.03)*** (8.45)*** 
ln(wages)i,t 0.0006 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
1.87 0.58 0.29 0.07 0.17 
ln(UBs) i,t 
 
-5.468 -5.262 
 
-5.236 
 
 
(-10.76)*** (-10.03)*** 
 
(-2.51)** 
ln(Unions)i,t 
 
 
-0.201 -0.211 -0.209 
  
 
(-2.31)*** (-2.98)*** (-1.67)* 
ln(EPL)i,t 
  
 
-0.465 
 
   
 
-0.92 
 
ln(ALMPs)i,t 
  
  
-0.162 
 
  
  
-0.09 
Number of Observations 189 176 176 185 159 
Number of Countries 26 26 26 26 26 
Number of Instruments 19 13 14 19 15 
Wald test 142.22*** 258.47*** 334.4*** 254.8*** 472.1*** 
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Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 
AR test (-1.71)* (-2.41)** (-2.41)*** (-1.73)* (-2.35)** 
Sargan test 13.21 12.22 11.92 13.04 10.34 
Source: our estimations based on OECD  
(2016a and 2016b), OECD (2017a, 2017b, 2017c and 2017d).  
Notes: * Heteroscedasticity robust z-statistics are in parentheses.  
*** significant at 1%, ** 5%, * 10%, respectively. P-values without an index mean that the coeffi-
cient is not significant even at the 10% level. 
At the bottom section of the tables, the significant Wald tests suggest that the dynamic 
specification should be preferred in all cases and in our models (1)-(5). Thus, the significant 
p-levels of AR(1) tests, derived firstly by Arellano and Bond (1991), indicate the lack of 
autocorrelation in the first differenced errors. According to the Sargan tests, restricted later 
by Hansen (1982), the null-hypothesis of the validity of over-identifying restrictions in our 
models can be rejected, as well. 
The impacts of the minimum wages (wages) are robust in all native-born models and the 
real minimum wages at constant prices have significant negative z-statistics. As our results 
indicate, their effects on employment growth seem not to be large. The coefficients range 
from circa -0.0005% to -0.0009%. Meanwhile, in the case of foreign employment, we can-
not find significant results. The lack of significance, in these cases, could only mean that 
changes in minimum wages do not indicate employment growth in foreign employment at a 
given level of other determinants in our models. 
Nevertheless, according to labour economics theories, unemployment benefits (UBs) at-
tainment and union density (Unions) negatively relate to employment growth in both mod-
els. There are no substantial disparities among places of birth, because union density corre-
lated with employment growth negatively to the same degree. Although, in the case of UBs 
we also found that if there is an increase in the ratio of benefits this may affect foreign em-
ployment growth more negatively. In other words, if continuous time is assumed in these 
cases, foreign-born employment decreased more than native-born employment. 
In Tables no. 1 and 2 we also show a valid representation of the relationship between EPL, 
ALMPs and employment growth in the long run. The effect of a 1% increase in the strict-
ness of employment legislation resulted in a decrease in employment growth of 0.35 per-
centage points. Nevertheless, the significant positive (1.97) coefficient of active labour pro-
grammes reveals that these contributions increase employment growth in all cases. Un-
fortunately, we cannot compare the effects of these institutions on foreign employment 
growth, because of the lack of significance. 
 
Conclusions 
The main contribution of our research is to provide new empirical evidence from 
immigration to enhance their employment in several OECD countries. This paper also 
relies on the determinants of employment growth tendencies by place of birth. Anyway, the 
growth in employment was higher for foreign- than native-born migrants. Consequently, in 
almost all OECD countries examined, the foreign-born share in employment has increased 
due to demographic trends of ageing natives and new arrivals of immigrants.  
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Thus, we found significant associations between the place of birth of migrants, their ageing 
and educational attainment. Native-born migrants seem to be older and better skilled than 
those were born abroad. These phenomena derive from the fact that immigrants bring their 
abilities from their home countries, which are often different from those of natives. The 
importance of developing their existing educational and language skills are one of the 
challenges of migration policies in the future. A better knowledge of immigrants for host 
countries is essential to ensure their labour potential. 
According to the theoretical background of our research it must note that labour institutions 
can explain a large element of the unexplained characteristics of migration (Williamson, 
2000). Indeed, we can accept our hypothesis (H1), by the effects of examined labour 
institutions on the employment growth of migrants. In our empirical results significant 
interactions founded between minimum wages, union density, and unemployment benefits 
(UBs), EPL and ALMPs in the case of native-born migrants’ employment. From the point 
of view of foreign-born workers, only UBs and unions correlated significantly. 
Overall, we can conclude from these results that the decrease in unemployment benefits 
(UBs), and the reduced power of (trade) unions could be a fruitful way to enhance 
employment growth for both types of migrants. Indeed, the main responsibility for welfare 
payments, especially UBs, generally considered to labour unions, rather than governments, 
i.e. as a feature of the ‘Ghent’ system. Nevertheless, in the results of our dynamic models, 
an increase in unemployment benefits resulted in a greater decrease in the employment 
growth of foreign-born migrants. In other words, the less skilled and ageing foreign-born 
migrants tend to leave the labour market for inactivity if the benefits are more generous. 
Furthermore, less strict employment protect legislation (EPL), lower minimum wages and 
more supported active labour market programmes (ALMPs) seem to increase the 
employment growth of native-born migrants. These interpretations lead to different policy 
recommendations. In practice, the first is to allow for contracts that are more flexible where 
the risk of bad job decisions would be lower. The second is to emphasize the crowding out 
effects of minimum wages on employability and, finally, to point out those ALMPs should 
focus on immigrant trainings in the first years. 
We should also emphasize the limitations of our estimations. These empirical findings were 
able to demonstrate only one aspect of the effects of labour institutions on the employment 
growth of migrants. Evidently, other determinants are also correlate with the employment. 
Hence, the validity of our conclusions limited by the bias caused by the exclusion of these 
variables. Moreover, we believe that a better understanding of the employment features of 
immigrants than is currently typical is a potentially important element in the success of 
policies to resolve the forthcoming labour crisis. Hence, further research directions, such as 
the role of social inclusion, active citizenship and living conditions etc., in this migration 
approach could be fruitful and worth future analysis. 
 
References 
Akerlof, G., 1984. An Economist’s Book of Tales. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Angrist, J. D. and Kugler, A. D., 2003. Protective or Counter-productive? Labour Market 
Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives. The Economic Journal, 113, 
pp. 302–F331. 
International Migration ‒ Economic Implications AE 
 
Vol. 19 • No. 46 • August 2017 817 
Antecol, H., Cobb-Clark, D. and Trejo, S., 2003. Immigration Policy and the Skills of 
Immigrants to Australia, Canada and the United States. Journal of Human Resources, 
38(1), pp. 192-218. 
Arellano, M. and Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies, 
58, pp. 277-297. 
Becker, G., 1974. A Theory of Social Interaction. Journal of Political Economy. 82, pp. 
1063-1093. 
Bertola, G., 2004. A Pure Theory of Job Security and Labour Income Risk. Review of 
Economic Studies, 71, pp 43-61. 
Blanchard, O. and Katz, L. H., 1992. Regional Evolutions. Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, pp. 1-75. 
Blanchflower, D. G. and Oswald, A. J., 2004. Well-Being Over Time In Britain and the 
USA. Journal of Public Economics, 88(7-8), pp. 1359-1386. 
Bodvarsson, Ö. B. and Van den Berg, H., 2013. The Economics of Migration: Theory and 
Policy. New York, Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London: Springer. 
Boeri, T., Hanson, G. and McCormick, B., 2002. Immigration Policy and the Welfare 
System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boeri, T. and Macis, M., 2010. Do Unemployment Benefits Promote or Hinder Structural 
Change? Journal of Development Economics, 93, pp. 109-125. 
Boeri, T. and Van Ours, J., 2013. The Economics of Imperfect Labour Markets. 2nd Ed. s.l: 
Princeton University Press. 
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J. and Leeson, P. T., 2008. Institutional Stickiness and the New 
Development Economics. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 67(2), pp. 
331-358. 
Borjas, G. J., 1987. Self-selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. American Economic 
Review, 77(4), pp. 531-53. 
Borjas, G. J., 1994. The Economics of Immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32, 
pp. 1668-1717. 
Borjas, G. J., 1995. The Economic Benefits from Immigration. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9(2), pp. 3-22. 
Borjas, G. J., 2003. The Labour Demand Curve is Downward-sloping: Re-examining the 
Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 18(4),  
pp. 1335-1174. 
Borjas, G. J., 2006. Labor Economics. 4th ed. Cambridge: McGraw Hill. 
Cahuc, P. and Zylberberg, A., 2010. Labour Economics. Cambridge, London: MIT Press. 
Calmfors, L., 1995. What can we Expect from Active Labour Market Policy? 
Konjunkturpolitik, 43, pp. 11-30. 
Card, D. and DiNardo, J., 2000. Do Immigrant Inflows Lead to Native Outflows? The 
American Economic Review, 90(2), pp. 360-367.  
Card, D., 2005. Is the New Immigration Really so Bad? Economic Journal, 115(507), pp. 
300-324. 
AE The Relations between Labour Market Institutions and Employment of Migrants 
 
818 Amfiteatru Economic 
Carens, J., 1987. Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders. The Review of Politics, 
49(2), pp. 251-273. 
Checchi, D. and Lucifora, C., 2002. Unions and Labour Market Institutions in Europe. 
Economic Policy, 35, pp. 363-408. 
Coleman, D., 2009. Migration and Its Consequences in 21st Century Europe. Vienna 
Yearbook of Population Research, 7, pp. 1-18. 
Dolado, J., Kramarz, F., Machin, S., Manning, A., Margolis, D. and Teuling, C., 1996. The 
Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe. Economic Policy, 23, pp. 317-372. 
Dustmann, C. and Gitz, A., 2005. Immigration, Jobs and Wages: Theory, Evidence and 
Opinion. London: CREAM-CEPR. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Visser, J., 2000. Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945. London, 
UK: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
Flinn, C., 2007. Minimum Wage Effects on Labour Market Outcomes under Search, 
Matching and Endogenous Contact Rates. Econometrica, 74(4), pp. 1013-1062. 
Friedberg, R. M. and Hunt, J., 1995. The Impact of Immigrants on Host Countries Wages, 
Employment and Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9, pp. 23-44. 
Gramlich, E., 1976. Impact of Minimum Wages on other Wages, Employment and Family 
Incomes. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2, pp. 409-451. 
Hans-Werner, S., 2005. Migration and Social Replacement Incomes: How to Protect Low-
Income Workers in the Industrialized Countries against the Forces of Globalization and 
Market Integration. International Tax and Public Finance, 12(4), pp. 375-393. 
Hansen, L. P., 1982. Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments 
Estimators. Econometrica, 50(4), pp. 29-1054. 
Hatton, T. J., 2004. Seeking Asylum in Europe. Economic Policy, 19, pp. 5-62. 
Im, K. S. , Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for Unit Roots in Heterogeneous 
Panels. Journal of Econometrics, 11(5), pp. 53-74. 
Kerr, S. K. and Kerr, W. R., 2011. Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey. Finnish 
Economic Papers, 24(1), pp. 1-32. 
Kopczuk, W., Slemrod, J. and Yitzhaki, S., 2005. The Limitations of Decentralized World 
Redistribution: An optimal taxation approach. European Economic Review, 49(4),  
pp. 1051-1079. 
Kwok, V. and Leland, H., 1982. An Economic Model of the Brain Drain. The American 
Economic Review, 72(1), pp. 91-100. 
Lewis, E., 2005. Immigration, Skill Mix, and the Choice of Technique, NBER Working 
Papers 05-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. 
Marshall, A., 1890. Principles of Economics, London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 
Máté, D., 2014. Human Capital, Unions and Productivity in a Labour-skilled Sectoral 
Approach. Society and Economy, 36(3), pp. 369-385. 
Mincer, J., 1976. Unemployment Effects of Minimum Wages. Journal of Political 
Economy, 84, pp. 87–104. 
Neumark, D. and Wascher, W., 2007. Minimum Wages and Employment, IZA Discussion 
Paper. No. 2570. 
International Migration ‒ Economic Implications AE 
 
Vol. 19 • No. 46 • August 2017 819 
Nickell, S. and Andrews, M., 1983. Unions, Real Wages and Employment in Britain, 1951–
79. Oxford Economic Papers, 35(1), pp. 183-206. 
North, D. C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD, 2012. International Migration Outlook 2012. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD, 2014. Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs. Paris: OECD 
Publishing.  
OECD, 2015a. International Migration Outlook 2015. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
OECD, 2015b. Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In. Paris: OECD 
Publishing 
OECD, 2016a. Foreign-born Employment. [online] Available at: <https://data.oecd.org/ 
migration/foreign-born-employment.htm> [Accessed 28 December 2016]. 
OECD, 2016b. Native-born Employment. [online] Available at: <https://data.oecd.org/ 
migration/native-born-employment.htm> [Accessed 28 December 2016]. 
OECD 2016c. Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries: DIOC. [online] 
Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/dioc.htm> [Accessed 28 December 2016]. 
OECD, 2017a. Minimum Wages at Current prices in NCU. [online] Available at: 
<http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=MW_CURP#> [Accessed 2 January 2017].  
OECD, 2017b. Public Expenditure and Participant stocks on LMP. [online] Available at: 
<http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=49447#> [Accessed 2 January 2017].  
OECD, 2017c. Trade Union Density. [online] Available at: <http://stats.oecd.org// 
Index.aspx?QueryId=49447#> [Accessed 2 January 2017].  
OECD, 2017d. Strictness of employment protection. [online] Available at: 
<http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?QueryId=49447#> [Accessed 2 January 2017].  
OECD, 2017e. Glossary of Statistical Terms: Definition of Foreign-born Migrants. [online] 
Available at: <https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1022> [Accessed 2 January 
2017].  
Pakurár, M., Cehla, B., Oláh, J. and Nábrádi, A., 2013. Employment Characteristics of 
Ukrainian Citizens in Hungary, Apstract – Applied Studies in Agribusiness and 
Commerce, 7(4-5), pp. 113-120.  
Piore, M., 1986. Labour Market Flexibility. Berkeley, CA: University of California. 
Smith, A., 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: 
W. Strahan. 
Smith, J. P. and Edmonston, G., 1997. The New Americans: Demographic and Fiscal 
Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
Stigler, G., 1946. Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation. American Economic Review, 
36, pp. 535-543. 
Windmeijer, F., 2005. A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Efficient 
Two-Step GMM Estimators. Journal of Econometrics, 126(1), pp. 25-51. 
Williamson, O. E., 2000. The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 38(9), pp. 595-613. 
 
AE The Relations between Labour Market Institutions and Employment of Migrants 
 
820 Amfiteatru Economic 
APPENDIX 
Table no. 3: Cross table of immigrants by age and place of birth 
  Age Total 
15-24 24-65 65+ 
Native Count 848 915 839 2602 
% within native 32.6% 35.2% 32.2% 100% 
% of Total 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 1.0% 
Foreign Count 82651 105270 72824 260745 
% within foreign 31.7% 40.4% 27.9% 100% 
% of Total 31.4% 40.0% 27.7% 99.0% 
Total Count 83499 106185 73663 263347 
% of Total 31.7% 40.3% 28.0% 100% 
Source: estimations based on OECD, 2016c 
Notes: Pearson Chi-Square = 35.125 at p<0.01 level. 
Table no. 4: Cross table of immigrants by educational attainment and place of birth 
 
  Educational attainment 
Total 
ISCED 0/1/2 ISCED 3/4 ISCED 5a/5b ISCED 6 
Native Count 572 570 567 473 2182 
% within native 26.2% 26.1% 26.0% 21.7% 100% 
% of Total 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 1.0% 
Foreign Count 58469 60119 56765 37759 213112 
% within foreign 27.4% 28.2% 26.6% 17.7% 100% 
% of Total 27.2% 27.9% 26.4% 17.5% 99.0% 
Total Count 59041 60689 57332 38232 215294 
% of Total 27.4% 28.2% 26.6% 17.8% 100% 
Source: estimations based on OECD, 2016c 
Notes: ISCED 0/1/2 Pre-primary/Primary/Lower secondary education, ISCED 3/4 (Upper) 
secondary/Post-secondary non-tertiary education, ISCED 5A/5B First stage of tertiary education 
(Bachelor and Master), ISCED 6 Second stage of tertiary education,  
Pearson Chi-Square =23.924 at p<0.01 level. 
Table no. 5: The correlation matrix of the independent variables of Equation (1) 
 
Variables ln(wages)it ln(UBs)it ln(Unions)it ln(EPL)it ln(ALMPs)it 
ln(wages)it-1 1.000 
  
  ln(UBs)it 0.047 1.000 
 
  ln(Unions)it 0.765 -0.158 1.000 
 
 ln(EPL)it 0.696 -0.228 0.483 1.000  
ln(ALMPs)it -0.669 -0.395 -0.636 -0.413 1.000 
Source: our estimations based on OECD, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d 
